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ABSTRACT 17 
 18 
Language’s intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other 19 
communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured 20 
intentional action and mutual mind-reading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities 21 
in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect 22 
unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest progress in identifying 23 
analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) 24 
production of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches 25 
investigating communication across sensory modalities.  To move forward, we argue a framework 26 
fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into 27 
a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be 28 
met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps 29 
elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to better 30 
clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans. 31 
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I. Language is considered to be one of the pinnacles of human biological evolution (Fitch 2010). Its 39 
emergence in the Homo lineage was presumably enabled by the presence of a set of cognitive abilities 40 
and ecological conditions not shared by other species. One candidate for these abilities is the capacity 41 
to act with, and understand, communicative intentions. The philosopher of language, Paul Grice (1957, 42 
1982), was pivotal in highlighting the importance of such a psychological framework for 43 
communication and many authors working in the ‘Gricean’ tradition have followed him in arguing 44 
that the ability for intentional communication requires a sophisticated, pre-existing, metapsychological 45 
framework in which speaker and hearer (or signaler and receiver) mutually understand one another’s 46 
intentions and beliefs (Sperber & Wilson 1995, Sperber 2000, Tomasello 2008, Scott-Phillips 2015a). 47 
 48 
Within Grice’s influential analysis of speaker meaning there exist three clauses (Strawson 1964, Jacob 49 
1997), the conjunction of which form the basis for Grice’s theory of communication. For a signaler, S, 50 
to mean something via utterance x requires that: i) S intends that S’s utterance of x induce a response, r, 51 
in receiver, R; ii) S intends that R recognises that S has intention (i), and iii) S intends that R’s 52 
recognition of S’ intention functions at least partly in the motivation for R’s response, r.  On this 53 
account, we not only intend to influence the receiver (through the production of a stimulus) when 54 
communicating, we also want them to recognise that we are acting with such intentions, and respond 55 
on the basis of recognising this. In linguistic pragmatics this communication of intention (surmised by 56 
these three clauses) is often referred to as ostensive or Gricean communication and the reiterated 57 
mutual perspective taking that underlies this process has consequently been highlighted as a defining 58 
feature of human linguistic communication (e.g. Grice 1982, Dennett 1983, Sperber and Wilson 1995, 59 
Sperber 2000, Tomasello 2008, Scott-Phillips 2015a). 60 
  61 
 62 
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Given the proposed centrality of Gricean characterisations of communication (Grice 1957) to human 63 
communicative interaction, questions have been raised as to the uniqueness of these aspects of human 64 
language.  The extent to which human and non-human animal communication could involve the same 65 
underlying psychological framework has been debated (Gomez 1994, Tomasello 2008, Scott-Phillips 66 
2015a, b, Moore 2015a). One reason for this is that on standard accounts (Dennett 1983, Sperber 67 
2000), Gricean communication requires that communicators are capable of entertaining very complex 68 
metarepresentations – that is, representations of others’ mental states. Dennett (1983, 1988) played a 69 
critical role in initial attempts to operationalise animals as intentional systems by differentiating 70 
between various orders of the metarepresentational complexity that intentional communication 71 
requires, based on Grice’s analysis (Dennett 1983). Zero-order intentionality attributes no mentality or 72 
intention to the communicative signalling of animals. First-order intentionality requires that the 73 
signaler intends to signal to produce a response in the recipient, but does not require that the recipient 74 
recognise this. Second-order intentionality involves complementing the intention to signal with the 75 
attribution of mental states (by the recipient to the signaler); whilst third- order intentionality requires 76 
that the signaler intend for the recipient to attribute to her the intention to signal. Finally, fourth-order 77 
intentionality requires that signaler and recipient, alike, represent both the signaler’s goal and her 78 
intention that the recipient recognise that goal (Dennett 1983, Sperber and Wilson 1995, Scott-Phillips 79 
2015a,b).  80 
 81 
Although this operationalisation would appear to serve as a useful guide to identifying what type of 82 
intentionality an animal communicative system displays, it has also generated problems related to 83 
what the levels of intentionality represent. As Dennett has noted, both first and higher orders of 84 
intentionality require that an act of signalling is produced voluntarily and in a goal-directed way. 85 
However, second order intentionality (and beyond) likely employs cognitive mechanisms of a 86 
qualitatively different kind - since it requires that both signaler and recipient engage in some form of 87 
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mental state attribution. For this reason, second order intentionality has received most interest because 88 
it has been generally considered as more “human” or, as Grice highlighted, as more indicative of “true” 89 
linguistic communication (Grice 1957) and hence a step further along the continuum towards human 90 
language (Scott-Phillips 2015a). One major consequence is that it has since become common-place to 91 
assume that in order to demonstrate convincing evidence that animal vocal production is intentional 92 
and thus relevant to human language, at the very least, an attribution of mental states during vocal 93 
communication is required.  94 
 95 
This emphasis of mental state attribution is unhelpful for two reasons. Firstly, whilst adult humans are 96 
competent at reiterated mental-state attribution, there is evidence that younger children find high 97 
orders of metarepresentation difficult (Wimmer & Perner 1983, Liddle & Nettle 2006). Some working 98 
in primate cognition have therefore argued that, if standard interpretations of Grice are right, then 99 
Gricean communication would be too difficult for both animals and human children. If this is correct, 100 
then standard interpretations must overstate the cognitive pre-requisites of Gricean communication 101 
(Gomez 1994, Moore 2014, 2015a,b) – and human and animal communication may share a common 102 
psychological framework after all. The less-intellectualised approaches to human communication are 103 
supported by the argument that even in adults, speech production and interpretation seems not to 104 
always require inference computation or belief ascription about speaker intentions (Millikan 1984). 105 
Furthermore, experimental studies under controlled conditions have repeatedly demonstrated that 106 
mind-reading is not deployed automatically during social and communicative situations (Keysar et al. 107 
2003, Apperly et al. 2006) and is even sometimes impeded by the surrounding social environment 108 
(McClung et al. 2013). 109 
 110 
A second reason for resisting the mental state attribution approach is that it risks obscuring the goals 111 
of comparative psychology and biology. The comparative approach does not aim to show that animals 112 
communicate in a way that fully equates to human communication; instead it aims to elucidate 113 
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evolutionary precursors of crucial components of human language (Seyfarth et al. 1980, Zuberbühler 114 
2005). The comparative study of semantics, for example, does not hinge on the discovery of symbolic 115 
conventions, displaced in time and space from the referents of communicative behaviour (Tomasello 116 
2008). In that case, to try to evaluate what other animals are doing by human standards is to risk 117 
failing to do justice to their abilities. A more theory-neutral approach to studying intentional 118 
communication would therefore be better.  119 
 120 
In line with this idea, over the last ten years Byrne, Hopkins, Leavens, Tomasello, and colleagues have 121 
taken a less theory-laden approach to intentionality. This approach sidesteps the requirement that 122 
intentional communication involves understanding the minds of others and does not assume that 123 
intentional use of communicative signals involves the sorts of ‘ostensive-inferential’ communication 124 
that thinkers in the Gricean tradition have argued characterises human communication. Through 125 
borrowing behavioural markers implemented by developmental psychologists to distinguish between 126 
reflexive and more intentional gestural communication in children (Bates et al. 1979), progress has 127 
been made in identifying traits that are precursors to distinctively human intentional communication 128 
systems (Leavens et al. 2005, Liebal et al. 2006). In a similar way to humans, non-human primates, 129 
primarily great apes, also communicate with each other by gesturing. Observations of the production 130 
of gestures suggest that they fulfil a number of the criteria specified for intentionality in 131 
communicative signals (table 1). Individuals have, for example, been observed to take into account the 132 
attention state of the receiver, only gesturing when selected receivers are appropriately attentive 133 
(Leavens et al. 2005), and to elaborate or change signal if their initial signal fails to reach the apparent 134 
goal (Cartmill and Byrne 2007). By avoiding the question of mental state attribution, and by focusing 135 
on behavioural markers of flexible and goal-directed communication, an array of studies have 136 
demonstrated first order intentionality in the communication of our closest living relatives (Call & 137 
Tomasello 2007, Pika & Liebal 2012, Byrne 2016). 138 
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 139 
However, there exists some variation in the criteria of intentionality that individual studies apply to 140 
gestural signals and rarely has there been an attempt to apply all criteria to a single signal in a study 141 
species (but see Leavens et al. 2004). Moreover, each individual marker of intentionality in isolation 142 
can be explained through lower-level mechanisms, without needing to invoke intentionality. For 143 
example, sensitivity to the attention state of the receiver could simply be a learned discrimination 144 
where signals are only produced when a receiver’s face can be seen; persistence of a signal may have 145 
nothing to do with an intention to communicate with an as yet unresponsive receiver, but simply that 146 
signal production is emotionally driven and only when the goal is met does the underlying emotion 147 
change and terminate signal production (Liebal et al., 2013, Gaunet & Massioui 2014, Savalli et al. 148 
2014). Therefore, it is important, before invoking first order intentionality, to demonstrate convergent 149 
evidence from a number of markers of intentionality for the same signal and species (Liebal et al. 150 
2013, though see Vail et al. 2013). Although multiple cases of converging evidence do not amount to a 151 
proof, the probability of a behaviouristic explanation decreases. 152 
 153 
 Whilst gestural studies highlight potential phylogenetic precursors to the intentional communication 154 
of humans and provide crucial comparative data, similar evidence from vocal communication studies 155 
has not been considered as equally convincing. Despite numerous attempts, researchers have failed to 156 
teach enculturated apes to produce spoken language (Yerkes and Yerkes 1929, Hayes 1951). As their 157 
vocalisations are commonly produced in specific contexts, it has been traditionally assumed that 158 
vocalisations are the product of low level emotional processes and are best characterised as 159 
involuntary responses to specific stimuli rather than voluntary, goal-directed signals (Dennett 1983, 160 
Notman & Rendall 2005, Tomasello 2008). Furthermore, invasive procedures have shown that call 161 
initiation in monkeys is mediated by limbic rather than cortical structures in the brain (Jurgens 1992).  162 
On the other hand, some studies suggest that vocal and non-vocal sounds are used intentionally. 163 
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Leavens, Hopkins and colleagues have shown that great apes use voiced and unvoiced sounds in a 164 
controlled manner that implies flexibility and intentionality (Russell et al. 2005, Hopkins et al 2007, 165 
Hostetter et al. 2007, Hopkins et al. 2011). More recent studies, under natural conditions, have 166 
provided additional support for intentionality in ape vocalisations (Crockford et al. 2012, 2015, Schel 167 
et al. 2013). Moreover, multiple studies have shown vocalisations to be dependent on the surrounding 168 
social audience in a variety of species (Marler et al. 1986, Zuberbühler 2008, Crockford et al. 2012). 169 
These so called “audience effects” are not solely due to simple, arousal mediated, social facilitation 170 
effects (Zajonc 1965), as might be the case when examining the presence or absence of conspecifics 171 
(Tomasello 2008). Instead, they incorporate more subtle social and behavioural variations, e.g. 172 
relationship quality (Slocombe et al. 2010, Mazinni et al. 2013, Schel et al. 2013,) or response of 173 
receivers (Wich and de Vries 2006).  174 
 175 
Despite this body of data, the existence of intentional vocal communication in animals is still disputed 176 
(Tomasello 2008). Given the central role intentionality plays in human language and the apparent 177 
disparity between the intentional production of gestures and non-intentional vocalisations in non-178 
human primates, it has been argued that language must have evolved via a gestural, rather than a vocal, 179 
route (Corballis 2002, Tomasello 2008). This theoretical reasoning certainly adds fuel to the fiery 180 
debate surrounding language’s evolutionary emergence. But unfortunately it fails to consider the fact 181 
that the researchers working with gestures and vocalisations, respectively, are operating from different 182 
bases (Slocombe et al. 2011). Animal vocal communication researchers are investigating how the 183 
production of vocalisations may or may not be used to influence the mental states of receivers, often 184 
with negative results (Rendall et al. 2000; but see Crockford et al. 2012, Schel et al. 2013). By contrast, 185 
gestural communication researchers are using an in-place suite of behaviours, derived from child 186 
developmental work, to address how goal-directed and hence intentional (Dennett’s first order 187 
intentionality) gestural production is, predominantly in primates. This means that the research into 188 
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vocalisations tacitly employs a more demanding criterion for intentionality than the research into 189 
gestures. As a result, comparing intentional production of animal signals at different levels in the two 190 
different modalities commits the mistake of not comparing like with like, and hence renders it difficult 191 
to draw reliable conclusions about differences in intentionality across these modalities.  192 
 193 
To resolve these conceptual and methodological difficulties we propose to ‘level the playing field’ 194 
with an updated framework in which the intentional nature of animal communication, irrespective of 195 
modality, can be operationalised and systematically assessed. A single framework approach will 196 
facilitate direct comparative work amongst species and communicative mediums, providing a more 197 
holistic picture of the evolution of human intentional communication. 198 
 199 
II. The new framework 200 
The framework that we propose consists of three distinct criteria, each of which needs to be met by a 201 
signal type before intentionality is ascribed to it. We do not abandon consideration of cognitive 202 
components to intentionality, but instead argue that questions about whether or not vocal 203 
communication is produced voluntarily and in a goal-directed way can be answered independently of 204 
questions about whether signaler and receiver are engaged in mind-reading. Therefore, we return to 205 
goal-directedness and its role in intentional behaviour as the first criterion requiring satisfaction. 206 
 207 
Animal S intentionally communicates I to receiver R if the following three propositions all hold: 208 
 209 
1) S acts with a goal with the content I 210 
Goal directed behaviour has been a central focus of comparative psychology research over the last 211 
three decades. At a more rudimentary level the notion of goal-direction involves the role of motor-212 
processes organising action towards physical targets (Kenward et al. 2009). However, goal-213 
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directedness has also been implicated in intentional behaviour, as opposed to automatic or habitual 214 
behaviour (Heyes and Dickinson 1990). Here it is necessary to show that the goal-directed behaviour 215 
is based upon knowledge of the relationship that exits between the action and its consequences (Wit & 216 
Dickinson 2009). Hence within our new framework we shift the cognitive emphasis to demonstrating 217 
that communication is goal-directed.  218 
 219 
Whilst we appreciate that operationalisation of goal-directedness is not straightforward, it is a far more 220 
tangible and relevant criterion than the demonstration of mental state attribution. Previous studies 221 
probing the intentionality of primate gestures have emphasised the role of persistence and elaboration 222 
in identifying goal-directedness. In line with this, we argue that goal-directedness can be empirically 223 
investigated more generally by merging these criteria with the identification and application of 224 
‘stopping rules’ (Burkart et al. 2015). When a signaler possesses a goal for its communication, it 225 
would stop upon reaching the goal, but persist and/or elaborate the signal when the goal is not reached 226 
(Leavens et al. 2005). Thus, as with any other behavioural data, regular and reliable observations 227 
fulfilling the criteria (e.g. a goal-dependent cessation of communication, or indeed persistence and 228 
elaboration in the absence of the goal being met) are critical to demonstrating the presence of a goal, 229 
causally linked with the signal. Furthermore, experimental manipulation of goal end states leading to 230 
premature or delayed goal accomplishment is an additional, complementary way, to assess the causal 231 
link between the goal and the communicative signal. 232 
 233 
2) S produces voluntary, recipient directed signals as a means to reach the represented goal 234 
We agree with Leavens et al. (2004) and Moore (2015b) that to show intentionality, behaviour must be 235 
under volitional control and recipient-directed.  Criteria generated from studies of intentional 236 
communication in infants (Bates et al. 1979) represent a valuable set of measures to address these 237 
conditions (see table 1). One indicator of voluntary control is selective use of the signal, and in 238 
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particular, selectively producing or withholding a signal in response to social factors such as audience 239 
composition and behaviour (social use). As we highlighted above, social context could in principle be 240 
part of a complex stimulus to which an automatic, innate signal production mechanism responds. Thus 241 
Hurford (2007, page 232) argues that only if ‘circumstances under which calls are given are too 242 
implausibly complex to be hardwired into the genes’ should we infer these signals are voluntary. 243 
Indicators of the recipient-directed nature of a signal include social use, audience checking and 244 
sensitivity to attentional state (Ristau 1991, Povinelli et al. 2003, Liebal et al. 2004, Leavens et al. 245 
2005, Schel et al. 2013). Every signal type and study species is different. So, whilst it has been 246 
suggested that the more criteria satisfied the greater the confidence that a signal is indeed intentional 247 
(Schel et al. 2013), this may not always be plausible (e.g. certain criteria apply only to the visual 248 
domain). Thus we would argue for a strict a priori selection procedure of criteria to ensure fair 249 
comparisons across species and modalities. 250 
 251 
3) S’s signaling behaviour changes the behaviour of R in ways conducive to realising I 252 
As the last condition for intentionality, we focus on the behaviour of the receiver with respect to the 253 
signal produced. Given our shift of focus away from signaler or receiver mental state attribution we 254 
only require that the communicative behaviour of the signaler elicits a change in the behaviour of the 255 
receiver. To rule out the pitfall of simply treating any behavioural change in the receiver as sufficient 256 
for intentionality, we strengthen our condition by specifying that the change in the receiver’s 257 
behaviour must be repeatable, consistent and in line with the apparent intentions of the signaler.  258 
In order to demonstrate how our conditions can be operationalised, we shall now interpret data from a 259 
recent study on the alarm calling behaviour of chimpanzees within the new framework and assess its 260 
intentionality. 261 
 262 
An example of intentionality in vocal communication assessed with the proposed criteria 263 
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In a similar way to many primate and non-primate species, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes 264 
schweinfurthii) produce vocalisations when faced with dangerous situations (e.g. python or leopard 265 
presence, inter-group interactions). However, due to the rare occurrence of such signals, experimental 266 
manipulations are critical to rigorously assess the mechanisms underlying their production. Schel et al. 267 
(2013) exposed wild chimpanzees in the Budongo Forest, Uganda, to realistic moving snake models 268 
and recorded their vocal behaviour.  269 
 270 
In line with our framework, it is first critical to show that signalers exposed to model snakes signal 271 
with a goal with a particular content (I). To infer the goal of the signaler, Schel et al. (2013) 272 
investigated the cessation of alarm calling in chimpanzees. Theoretically, if the goal of alarm calling is 273 
to warn others, signalers should persist until all potential receivers are safe. By implementing an 274 
objective behavioural criterion of “safety” Schel et al. (2013) demonstrate that signal cessation was 275 
not affected by the safety of the signaler, but instead when receivers were safe (see also Wich and de 276 
Vries 2006). When alarm calling stopped, receivers were significantly more likely to be safe than 277 
during the rest of the experimental trial.  278 
 279 
Secondly, standardised criteria implemented in developmental child intentionality studies must be 280 
applied to the signal to assess its voluntary nature and degree of recipient directedness. Schel et al. 281 
(2013) showed that the production of certain types of alarm calls is influenced by the composition of 282 
the social audience, as the arrival of friends but not non-friends in the area elicited an increase in the 283 
production of these calls. Furthermore, analysis of audience checking behaviour, including gaze 284 
alternation, suggested that signalers monitor and potentially take into account the current behaviour of 285 
receivers when deciding to produce certain alarm calls. Hence chimpanzee alarm calls also appear 286 
recipient directed. 287 
 288 
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The third and final criterion requires that receivers of the signal must regularly respond in a way that is 289 
in line with the signaler’s presumed intentions. However, such a demonstration does not require that 290 
the receivers understand and represent the intentions of the signaler; and so does not imply any 291 
attribution of a mental state to the signaler by the recipient. Currently the data available from the study 292 
does not sufficiently satisfy this criterion, as Schel et al. (2013) did not directly explore the influence 293 
of alarm calling on the receiver’s behaviour. Nevertheless, certain observations do suggest that this 294 
condition may also have been satisfied. When hearing conspecific alarm calls, receivers have been 295 
observed to behave in a similar way as when they encounter predators naturally, including bipedal 296 
scanning behaviour and tree climbing (Slocombe et al. unpublished data, Crockford et al. 2015, see 297 
also Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). These behavioural observations suggest that the goal of the signaler, 298 
in terms of warning group members of a threat, has potentially been met. However, more systematic 299 
comparisons to baseline scanning behaviour indicating that the response was caused by the 300 
communicated content are still required. 301 
 302 
The above example of alarm calling in chimpanzees is not designed to demonstrate intentional 303 
communication. Instead, it simply serves to illustrate that the proposed framework for assessing 304 
intentional communication in animals is objective and realisable. Moreover, though there have been 305 
previous valuable attempts to operationalise intentionality (Leavens et al. 2005, Liebal et al. 2006, 306 
Vail et al. 2013, Hobaiter and Byrne 2014) these have been predominantly restricted to a single 307 
modality (but see Hopkins et al. 2007), complicating multi-modal comparisons which are vital to 308 
understanding intentional communication holistically. Our approach builds on existing work, but 309 
crucially bridges the current gap that exists between modalities through being applicable to any 310 
reliably and repeatedly observed communication signal. 311 
 312 
III. CONCLUSION 313 
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1. The voluntary nature of human communication has long been considered a key, potentially 314 
unique, feature of human cognition and language. In light of this, much comparative research 315 
has attempted to unveil analogous or homologous forms of voluntary communication in 316 
animals as a way to better understand what features are really unique to language and from this 317 
how the language faculty may have evolved (Hauser et al. 2002, Fitch 2010). However, 318 
advances in the field have been complicated by the scarcity of convincing evidence of 319 
voluntary production of animal communication in the vocal domain (Wheeler & Fischer 2012, 320 
Rendall and Owren 2013, though see Crockford et al. 2012). This gap in understanding has had 321 
far reaching impacts regarding the predicted evolutionary route via which language may have 322 
evolved, namely whether the origins of language were gestural or vocal.  323 
2. We propose that the problem does not lie only in insufficient data. Additionally, it is bound up 324 
with a preoccupation with questions about whether voluntary communicative acts in animals 325 
are produced with the same sorts of cognitively complex intentions thought characteristic of 326 
human communication – in particular, the intention to modify the mental states of receivers. 327 
Although mental state attribution and its role in mediating signal production is an important 328 
component of human intentional communication (Dennett 1983, Crockford et al. 2012), we 329 
argue that focusing on this alone detracts from the equally informative examples of behaviour. 330 
Moreover, the assumption that human communication must aim at changing mental states has 331 
been challenged (Moore, 2015a).  332 
3. How widely distributed first order intentionality is across the animal kingdom is a key question 333 
that must be addressed if we are to i) understand the unique qualities of intentionality in 334 
humans, ii) shed light on the modality and evolutionary route via which language evolved and 335 
iii) understand more generally the adaptive benefit of intentional signalling in non-human 336 
animals. 337 
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4. Critically, we provide the necessary framework to address first order intentionality, whether 338 
analogous or homologous, across modalities and species giving rise to a unified and unbiased 339 
understanding of the nature of intentional communication in animals.  340 
 16 
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Table 1: The criteria for intentional communication in animals pertinent to step 2 in the new 490 
framework. Amended from Schel et al. (2013).  491 
 492 
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 500 
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 503 
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Criterion Explanation 
Social use The signal is directed at a recipient. This can be assessed at various 
levels: 
1. Presence/absence audience effect: the signal is only produced in 
the presence of a recipient. 
2. Composition of audience: the signal is only produced in the 
presence of certain recipients (e.g., kin, dominants, friends) 
3. Behaviour of audience: signal production is contingent on the 
behaviour of the recipient 
Sensitivity to 
attentional 
state of 
recipient 
Visual signals are only produced in the field of view of recipients. If 
signaler does not have a recipient’s visual attention, tactile or auditory 
signals should be produced. This can also be considered a level (3) of 
audience effect. 
Manipulation  
of attentional 
state of 
recipient 
Before a visual signal is produced, attention-getting behaviours are 
directed towards a recipient who is not visually attending to the signaler 
or the signaler moves itself into the line of view of a recipient (Liebal et 
al. 2004). 
Audience 
checking and 
gaze 
alternation 
Signaler monitors the audience and visually orients towards the recipient 
before producing a signal. If a third entity is involved, gaze alternation 
may occur between recipients and this entity. 
